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NOTES AND COMMENTS
moved and the possibility of profit from a beach of the fiduciary relationship is
extinguished. It has been well stated, however, that the true basis is to.be found
in the unfairness of a fiduciary taking advantage of any opportunity when the
interests of the corporation justly call for protection.' This calls for an application
of ethical standards of what is fair and equitable to a particular set of facts.
In the final analysis any rule adopted should accomplish two things. In the
first place it should encourage, not impede, legitimate business transactions, and
in the second place it should accomplish justice to all parties. The rule in the
Deutsch case would satisfy the loyalty requirement, but in many instances it may
well be injurious to business. For example, if Deutsch had been precluded from
purchasing the stock at the outset, Acoustic would have failed immediately.
Although Acoustic later became bankrupt, there was a good chance of its survival.
The liberal rule would allow directors, on proper occasions, to assist the corpora-
tion by taking over necessary contracts or transactions when the corporation was
not financially able to do so. The same high degree of loyalty could be required
and enforced through the exaction by the courts of clear and convincing proof of
real financial inability. For these reasons it is submitted that financial inability
should be allowed as a defense when clearly established, since it is the more
practicable and equitable rule.
E. W RvEns
HALE v. HALE - KENTUCKY'S RECOGNITION OF THE
TENTATIVE TRUST
Where one deposits money in the bank in a savings account indicating an
intention to be trustee of the money for another, the courts in a number of juns-
dictions will find that he has created a "tentative trust" which may be revoked
completely or which may be revoked in part by withdrawals during his lifetime.
Therefore the trust is not final or complete except as to the amount in the account
at the depositors death. It is clear that such a trust is not testamentary and may
be created without the formalities of execution required by the Statute of Wills.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky recently recognzed and applied the tentative
trust doctrine for the first time in Hale v. Hale.' It is the purpose of this comment
to direct attention to this case, to describe the essential characteristics of the
doctrine and to suggest some of the more important implications in its recognition
by the Kentucky Court.
In the principal case, Hale deposited in a savings account a sum of money
to his own credit, and a bank employee, on Hale s orders, made an endorsement
on the bank deposit record, which Hale signed, directing that the money be paid
to Hales named children if anything happened to him. There was uncontradicted
testimony to the effect that Hale told others of the deposit and its purpose. About
a year after the deposit Hale died, but on the day before his death he issued to
his daughter a check against the account for the dual purpose of paying his ex-
penses and making a gift to her of the balance of the check, if any. Although it
was conceded that the memorandum on the bank record did not qualiafy as a will
' Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 328 Mass. 187, - 80 N.E. 2d 522,
529 (1948).
'313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W 2d 2 (1950).
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or as a gift inter tVros, the children contended that the fund was a parol trust
created for them with Hale as trustee. It was further argued that the trust was
irrevocable and that the check gave the daughter no claim against the fund.
The court held that the directions given to the bank in making the deposit and
the subsequent actions in reference to the deposit showed that Hale intended to
and did create a tentative trust for the named beneficiaries which was not re-
voked witun the lifetime of the settlor and that the amount remaining in the de-
posit passed to the beneficiaries. In addition, it was decided that the proof sup-
ported the daugher s clain to the balance of the check as a gift from her father.3
The tentative trust doctrine was first applied by the New York Court in the
case of In re Totter4 and such a trust is often called a Totten trust. The Court of
Appeals of New York described the nature of the trust as follows:
"A deposit by one person of his own money in his own
name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an
irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative
trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes
the gift in his lifetime by some uneqivocal act or declaration, such
as delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the
depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some
decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arses
that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the
death of the depositor."'
Other jurisdictions in following the New York authority have generally limited
their application of the doctrine to the basic fact situation involving a deposit of
money in a savings account by a person in his own name as trustee for another.
In those states where the tentative trust is not recogized, such a deposit results
either in no trust being created or in an irrevocable trust being created.
Since the facts in the Hale case follow closely the standard tentative trust
situation it may be helpful to analyze them further in terms of the essential
characteristics of this type of trust. First, there was deposit by Hale of Ins own
money in a savings account. This is an essential but simple question of fact and
can be determined by checking the deposit records of the bank. Second, Hale
deposited the money in his own name with the intention to be a trustee of it.
This necessary fact is sometimes rather difficult to prove directly, but it may be
established from acts and statements which coincide with or follow the deposit
2 The court was careful to distinguish the case of Turpin s Adm r v. Stringer,
228 Ky. 82, 14 S.W 2d 189 (1929), where it was held on facts very similar to the
Hale case that instructions to the bank as to the disposition of the account operated
neither as a valid inter vivos gift nor as a testamentary devise, leaving the account
to the deceased's estate. In the Turpm case, however, no claim was made that
the deposit created a trust for the named party, Thus, it was not authority as to
the issue in the Hale case.
' There is a definite problem in the Hale case as to the validity of the gift to
the daughter. It is not known if the question was raised before the Court of
Appeals and the opinion sheds little light on the problem. However, it is not in-
tended to discuss the question of gift in this comment.
'In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
Id. at -- 71 N.E. at 752.
I 1 Scorr, TRUSTS 854 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS sec. 58 (1985).
1 ScoTT, TRUSTS 855 (1989); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS sec. 58 (1985); 1
BOGERT, TRUSTS and TRUSTEES 842 (1985).
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and may be inferred to some extent from the nature of the deposit itself.' In the
principal case, for instance, there was an endorsement on the account record plus
oral statements to others. Third, Hale intended the trust resulting from the de-
posit to be revocable, rather than irrevocable. This is the feature of the tentative
trust which is difficult to reconcile with the characteristics of an ordinary express
trust because in the usual situation it is clear that a power to revoke must be re-
served. In the tentative trust situation, however, the only evidence on whether
the depositor actually intended to reserve, expressly or impliedly, a power to re-
voke is the nature of the deposit itself. The nature of the deposit alone is the
basis for infemng a reserved power to revoke and this inference is really the
critical determination in any finding that a tentative trust has been created.'
The evidence in the Hale case on the matter of revocability is somewhat con-
fusing. The court stressed five factors: (1) there was no evidence to contradict
the testimony of the mother and son that Hale specifically told them of the de-
posit and that it was for the benefit of the named children; (2) there was no
evidence of any instructions to the bank as to the account other than the memo-
randum in reference to the children; (3) there was no evidence of Hale ex-
pressly retaining any right to draw on the account; (4) the deposit was in a
savings as distinguished from a checking account; (5) the deposit remained
intact for almost a year, except for the single check drawn just prior to the death
of Hale. Considering these facts, the court drew the following conclusion:
" he put this deposit m the bank specifically for the
benefit of his three named children and he thereby intended to
create a trust fund for their use with himself as trustee. Even if he
reserved the right to withdraw on the deposit for his own use, of
which there is no evidence here, he created a tentative trust enforce-
able on his death.""
It is submitted that the court might well have construed these facts standing
alone to indicate an intention for the trust to be irrevocable. On the other hand,
if this evidence served only to show an intent to create a trust and has no bearing
on the irrevocability of the trust, the conclusion of the court is sound and it
could properly declare that the daughter bad prior claim to the balance of the
check as a gift and still recognize the deposit as a trust fund for the named
children.
The concept of the tentative trust seemingly runs contrary to at least two
other basic trust principles. It appears to be testamentary, but the general author-
ity is that it is not testamentary because the trust actually arises on the opening
of the account.and not on the death of the depositor." It is not subject to a con-
dition precedent of death but, rather, to a condition subsequent in the form of a
power of revocation. Also, retention of absolute administrative control over the
trust res usually results in the invalidity of a trust. This power of control is to be
'I ScoTT, TRUSTS 354 (1989); Cf. 1 BOGERT, TRusTs and TRUsTEEs 202
(1935).
'RESTATEMENT, TRusTs sec. 58, comment a (1935); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS 354,
361 (1939). Scott his a footnote referring to cases cited in his sections 58.2
and 58.3 to the effect th-tt although a revocable trust was held to be created, many
of the cases had indic-tions of depositor s intent to create a revocable trust in
addition to the form of the deposit. Cf. 1 BO ERT, TRUSTS and TRusTEEs see. 47.
3183 Ky. at 350, 231 S.W 2d at 6.
U 1 ScoTT, TRuSTS 360 (1939); 1 BOGERT, TRusTs and TRuSTEES 220 (1935).
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distinguished from the power of revocation. Seemingly, a tentative trust is sub-
ject to the absolute control of the depositor which would result in there being no
trust. Actually, however, the depositor does not have a power of direct control
over the res but only a power to revoke in part or in whole." The existence of a
power to revoke does not prevent the creation of a present existing trust, and the
power of revocation, until exercised, has no effect upon the trust.
Thus, it is seen that the tentative trust is a conveient method of disposing
of money. The requirements of the laws of testamentary disposition, gifts, and
trusts do not have to be complied with to secure execution of the depositor s in-
tent. The will involves the formality of execution and the expense of administra-
tion and probate. The gift inter vivos requires the party to deliver and surrender
control of the property The gift once executed cannot be recalled. The trust re-
quires the separation of legal and beneficial interest, and to guarantee validity,
the settlor can retain only limited control. Even the power of revocation has to
be clearly reserved to exist, for if an irrevocable trust is created the settlor can-
not recall. The tentative trust is not bound by any of these restrictions. The
only requirement is for the deposit to be made so as to raise the tentative trust.
The depositor retains the power to revoke to such an extent that he actually has
control of the property. He can make any use of the deposit he desires, raising or
lowering the amount at will. No particular formalities are required in revoking
where the intent to revoke appears. 3 Kentucky, in accepting the tentative trust,
has recogmzed a method of disposing of money that permits the donor to retain
control over the money.
DEMPSEY A. Cox
HUGHETT v. CALDWELL COUNTY- MEASURE OF
DAMAGES FOR JNNOCENT CONVERSION OF MINERALS
In the recent Kentucky case of Hughett v. CaldwelU a mineral lease of an
abandoned right of way was executed to the defendants. The defendants did not
begin mimng operations until the title to the strip had been determined by the
circuit court to be in Caldwell County, the lessor. Later, after the defendants
had mined and sold a considerable quantity of fluorspar, the Court of Appeals
held that title to the stnp was in the plaintiffs.- Suit was then brought by the
plaintiffs to recover the value of the fluorspar which the defendants, as innocent
trespassers, had removed. The trial court, following the rule laid down by prior
decisions of the Court of Appeals, allowed the plaintiffs to recover only the reason-
able and customary royalty for the pnvilege of mining. On appeal the upper
court expressly overruled its former decisions3 and held that the correct measure
' Ibid.
' 1 ScoTT, TRusTs 362 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TnusTs sec. 58 (1935). Evi-
dently, the court construed the check drawn by the depositor on the account as a
revocation pro tanto. The nature and validity of the instrument may be subject to
question but a revocation in some manner is a requirement of the decision.
1313 Ky. 85, 230 S.W 2d 92 (1950).
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 288 Ky. 89, 155 S.W 2d 481 (1941).
Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 203 Ky. 307, 262 S.W 300
(1924); Bennett Jellico Coal Co. v. East Jellico Coal Co., 152 Ky. 838, 154 S.W
922 (1913).
